My Response to Plato's Meno

"There is virtue for every action and every age, for every task of ours and every one of us...the same is true for wickedness." Plato introduces the first defining object of virtue by introducing action. He defines virtue by the reactions to the age those actions either belong to or don't belong to. If virtue is defined as a reaction that either fits or doesn't fit, then virtue is defined by whether or not it aligns with external systems of virtue: order. The act of defining virtue is the process of finding order; definition is contingent on the idea that virtue is something capable of being self-control or control of the environment. To explain, I'll bring up whether or not freedom is a virtue.

Freedom's definition is in its meaning, but the act of definition implies an order. Any definition assumes specificity, and specificity assumes order. Freedom manifests itself as all virtue does, through specific, deliberate action. To be virtuous or just free is to create order, to manifest it in one's life by aligning oneself with external systems of virtue and freedom.

Freedom can be a state of mind, but does it define righteousness? Is freedom a part of any order? Does freedom fit into any order? Does freedom allow self-control or control of the environment as acts of righteousness do? Acts of righteousness are meant to have beneficial effects, therefore controlling its outcomes on the self and the environment. Freedom also can have beneficial effects, and allows independent control of one's life. So, freedom can be defined as a form of control, because its effects are liberating autonomy and boundaries. Its definition allows it to fit into existing systems.

I think virtue can be defined as beneficial, however, human virtue should not be defined by consequence in a chaotic world. Good intentions are meant to be beneficial. Therefore, human virtue is defined by external virtue; virtue itself is a response of gratitude and reverence both for the beauty of life and the lives that beauty belongs to.

Plato seems to assume that to desire bad things is misery, and no one wants misery, but doesn't claim that misery is to desire bad things. I'm not saying that's true. He claims that bad intentions don't exist, as everyone must desire what seems to them as good. He doesn't consider people's affinity for destruction and insulting the current order. While virtue is defined as reactive, malevolence is not considered reactive, as well.

Plato's Meno is a treatise with the truth, an embarkment on a journey towards the truth, and Socrates holds reverence for an existing order that passes on to Meno. The piece starts with Meno's wonder at virtue. Socrates encourages this wonder by exploring with respect for fundamental truths. The idea of fundamentality means that the world exists as something deeper than his own human life. The idea that life is deeper than his own actions means that he believes there is power behind those actions, whether he knows it or not. Without intentionality, one may do things that one does not know they're doing. The idea of virtue assumes that power, and their discussion of munificence asserts it. Whether or not a misunderstood action holds intentionality depends on understanding its "wisdom," and therefore the consequences of that action.